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RELIGION, AFTERLIFE, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES 
 




Economic historians have a rich literature applying 
economic theory to topics like unemployment, income, trade, and 
development.  These are appealing subjects since they allow the 
usual statistical analysis of historical data.  Researchers are less 
willing to explore, and journals are less willing to publish, 
application of economic theory to the history of changes in social 
institutions.  This hesitance is understandable.  Social institutions 
more often must be analyzed without using statistical tools, relying 
instead on "casual" empirical evidence, examples, and stylized 
facts. 
A few researchers do choose as a subject the history of 
social institutions.  As an example, Olson (1982) models several 
historical trends including the emergence of India's caste system.  
Posner (1980) uses economic theory to explain the role of the 
extended family in primitive society.  
One result of the work by authors like Posner and Olson is 
to extend the boundaries of what is considered an appropriate 
subject for economics research.  Indeed, a compelling 
characteristic of this new research in particular and of economic 
theory in general is its ability to explain a wide variety of human 
behavior. 
In this spirit, the following essay reviews an economic 
theory of religion and uses the theory to explain changes in 
attitudes toward hell, heaven, and divine retribution in Western 
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Europe during the Middle Ages.  The hypothesis is 
straightforward.  Religion serves a number of important functions, 
one of which is to provide an alternative to the state and to the 
local community in enforcing particular social behavior.  As the 
nature of the state's power, of the influence of the local 
community, and of economic activity change, religious doctrine 
changes in a predictable manner.  The behavior and doctrine of the 
Medieval knights and of the mendicant orders are used as 
examples.  Although applied to a particular period and culture, the 
theory is perfectly general and has implications for behavior in 
other cultures and other periods in history. 
Before proceeding, two caveats are in order.  First, the 
theory presented here neither promotes nor criticizes religion itself.  
Nothing in the theory proves or disproves any particular church's 
doctrine.  Second, the material presented here in no way explains 
all of the important events during the thousand years of the Middle 
Ages, nor does it refute views held by those outside economics.  
Doubtless historians will find counter examples and omissions.  
Economic theory cannot explain everything and in this case 
attempts only to provide some interesting insight into an important 
period in western history. 
 
 
The High Middle Ages 
 
The Middle Ages in western history encompasses a period 
from the fall of the Roman Empire in the fifth century to the 
beginning of the Reformation in the fifteenth century.  The middle 
three hundred years, from the eleventh through the thirteenth 
centuries, are often designated the High Middle Ages since they 
represent a period of relative prosperity and progress. 
Two institutions dominated the High Middle Ages: the 
feudal system and the Catholic Church.  The feudal system was 
characterized by relatively small self-sufficient manors controlled 
by a hereditary lord who provided local government services and 
security to peasant serfs.1  Serfs in turn supported the lord with 




labor services and agricultural products.  The manorial lord was 
loosely tied by bonds of vassalage, kinship, and tradition to 
regional and "national" royal families.  These higher royalty 
provided some security and additional services and taxed the 
manorial lord in money and in kind. 
After the Roman Empire dissolved, the feudal system 
emerged because it offered relative security at the local level.  As 
North (1981) shows, military technology in the form of the 
mounted knight and the relatively invulnerable castle in large part 
dictated the scale of local social and economic organization.  The 
subsequent invention of gun powder, the requirement for large 
standing armies, and improvements in transportation and 
technology in turn insured that nation states would replace the 
feudal system. 
The second important force in the High Middle Ages was 
the Catholic Church.  By the beginning of the eleventh century, 
most of Europe had converted to Christianity and most of the Near 
East and Africa to Islam.2  The Pope, at first simply the Bishop of 
Rome, became the autocratic head of a complex hierarchy 
extending down through regional bishops and local parish priests. 
Coincident with the emergence of its centralized 
organization and particularly beginning in the eleventh century, the 
Catholic Church's temporal power increased significantly.  Pope 
Leo III had recognized the power of an existing king as early as 
800 A.D. by crowning Emperor Charlemagne.  But by the 
beginning of the eleventh century, the church began extending this 
notion and asserting increased papal authority over heads of 
temporal kingdoms. 
An important Papal assertion of temporal authority came in 
1076 A.D. when Pope Gregory VII excommunicated the German 
King Henry IV.  At issue was Henry's attempt to invest a bishop, 
the papacy having recently begun claiming the sole right to do so.  
Henry withdrew the bishop's nomination and bowed to papal 
authority, even crossing the Alps alone in the middle of winter to 
submit to Gregory.  Despite Henry's later victory in the dispute, the 




mere fact that the Pope could seriously threaten temporal authority 
made this a critical event in the evolution of church power. 
Papal temporal authority continued increasing in the 
twelfth century.  Two crusades were launched.  Gothic art and 
architecture, much of it religiously inspired, highlighted the middle 
of the century. 
The early thirteenth century marked the height of Roman 
Catholic Church power in the Middle Ages.  Best representing this 
power, Pope Innocent III first crowned the German King Otto and 
then removed him by excommunication the next year.  Innocent 
then dictated the election of Otto's replacement two years later in 
1212 A.D.  In the same year Otto was crowned, Innocent's 
interdiction of England and excommunication of its King John 
forced the sovereign to accept Stephen Langton as archbishop of 
Canterbury. 
Under Innocent's leadership, Church influence extended 
through every level of society.  No less than crowned heads, 
common peasants bowed to Papal authority.  The Inquisition used 
coercion and fear to enforce religious purity.  The proverb about 
death and taxes was carried to its logical end as the church 





One of the less dramatic but more curious trends in the 
High Middle Ages is the change during the period in church 
doctrine and in popular attitude toward death and divine 
retribution.  In his extensive research on historical trends in 
attitudes toward death, Aries (1981) shows how the Middle Ages 
marked a period when Christians came to believe in hell and in 
divine judgment at the moment of death. 
Both before and in the first years after Europe's conversion 
to Christianity, people viewed death simply as sleep followed by 
one or another version of ascension to heaven for everyone at "the 
end of time".  By the beginning of the twelfth century, Christian 




attitudes toward death changed in an important way.  Now the 
dead faced the Last Judgment.  A period of sleep still followed 
death, but the faithful were separated from sinners and non-
believers at the end of time.  The former ascended to heaven, the 
latter two groups faced eternal damnation in hell. 
A second important but gradual change in church doctrine 
accelerated in the twelfth century.  As LeGoff (1984) explains in 
his history of the Christian concept, a period of testing and trial 
called purgatory now followed death.  In the early twelfth century, 
the church asserted that this period of trial was identical for 
everyone and preceded the Last Judgment. 
By the beginning of the thirteenth century, divine 
retribution took on its most immediate and dramatic form.  Now 
the forces of evil and good surrounded a person before death.  At 
the moment of death, the sum of the person's actions through life 
were judged.  Those of sufficient faith and having lives of 
sufficient goodness ascended to heaven.  Those without faith and 
with sinful lives descended to hell.  Questionable cases went to 
purgatory, where they stayed until the living acted to save them 
through prayer and intercession. 
Notice the change in the church's view of death and divine 
retribution.  In the early period, heaven was granted to all.  Later, 
the dead were judged and sent to heaven or hell at the end of time.  
Finally, judgment was immediate, although in some cases not 
final. 
What explains this change?  Aries sees it as another 
element in the overall transition from the attitude that people are 
defined mainly as members of a community, with little personal 
identity, to a time when individual identity is acknowledged.  This 
seems a reasonable hypothesis.  Aries shows how a variety of 
death and burial practices, including the use of grave markers, 
reflects an increasing recognition of individual identity. 
There is an alternative, although not a competing 
hypothesis.  An economic theory of religion explains this change 
and explains other church activities during the High Middle Ages. 
 





Economic Theory of Religion 
 
The economic theory of religion and the church is treated 
in detail elsewhere (Bold and Hull, 1985) and so is only reviewed 
here.  A church is modeled as a profit maximizing firm.  Although 
a church might be defined legally as a non-profit organization, the 
assumption of profit maximization is still appropriate.  In addition, 
the church need not make a conscious decision to maximize profit, 
and for that matter, need not be conscious of all of the products it 
provides. 
Several forces compel churches to maximize profit.  
Churches need resources to promote religious goals and churches 
gain revenue to the extent they manage their resources in an 
efficient manner.  Churches also compete with profit-maximizing 
firms for resources in many markets so church success again 
requires efficient behavior.  Finally, the long-run survival of a 
church in part depends on its ability to maintain non-negative 
wealth. 
Like ordinary firms, a church offers the set of products 
which exploits economies of scope, gains from tied sales, 
comparative advantage, the cost of information, and other 
economies.  The church-provided products of interest to this essay 
are social insurance, the promise of an appealing afterlife, and 
encouragement of particular social behavior. 
A church offers social insurance by encouraging members 
to help those less fortunate or, perhaps more commonly, to 
encourage member donations to church sponsored charitable 
activities.  The church promotes itself as the preferred agent to 
individuals with altruistic motives.  These altruistic individuals 
wish to give money to the less fortunate and are willing to pay the 
church to reduce information and transfer costs.  The church uses 
its reputation to assure individuals of its integrity and efficiency in 
this activity. 
Even some individuals without altruistic motives donate 
voluntarily to the church.  The church provides insurance against 




unforeseen misfortune like disease and local crop failure and, to 
some extent, foreseen events like old age.  For example, medieval 
monasteries often accepted substantial donations from elderly men 
in exchange for care until death.  To the extent that they are risk 
averse, individuals are willing to pay the church to provide these 
forms of insurance.  An individual without altruistic motives might 
also give to the poor to the extent doing so reduces property crime 
rates. 
In addition, the church uses techniques mentioned below to 
encourage donations by those who would otherwise not give to the 
less fortunate.  In so doing, the church reduces potential free rider 
problems and deals with issues of moral hazard and adverse 
selection in insurance markets. 
Heaven, an appealing afterlife, is a product offered by most 
of the world's religions.  The price of heaven typically includes 
prayer, faith, and donations.  The last directly increases church 
revenue.  In addition, the price of heaven commonly includes 
requirements for particular behavior, for Christian churches these 
include adherence to the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, 
and similar standards. 
Of all of the imaginable methods of earning heaven, 
churches encourage these particular behavior standards because 
they define and protect property rights and reduce other 
transactions costs.  These are valuable products, provision of 
which the church can have a significant comparative advantage. 
Property rights enforcement and particular social behavior 
are public goods.  They produce benefits freely available to 
everyone.  Ordinary firms find public goods production difficult 
because non-payers get a free ride.  In centralized states, public 
goods like property rights enforcement and enforcement of 
particular social behavior are typically produced by the state itself.  
The state possesses a developed and relatively efficient police and 
court system for detecting and punishing misbehavior. 
On the other end of the spectrum of social structures are 
primitive societies.  Even here enforcement of property rights and 
good social behavior is important.  However, as Posner (1980) 




shows, the small cohesive groups which characterize primitive 
societies rely on kinship bonds and on the fact that members of 
small groups are more sensitive to the fortunes of others than are 
members of large groups. 
When they provide or encourage provision of public goods, 
governments solve the problem of being unable to exclude non-
payers by using coercion and involuntary taxation.  Churches 
occasionally employ these methods as well.  However, the church 
also possesses an important tool not available to the state.  The 
church can exclude miscreants from heaven.  Even more 
frightening, the church can promise those who misbehave eternal 
damnation in hell.  Thus heaven and hell can be viewed as 
innovations in property rights enforcement uniquely available to 
the church.  The church employs heaven and hell to encourage 
production of valuable public goods. 
The foregoing suggests that the church is most important in 
providing property rights enforcement and particular behavior in 
societies with weak central governments and in cases where 
communities are large enough that common interest is an 
insufficient motive.  For example, robbery is less likely to occur in 
small communities where enforcement and detection is relatively 
easy.  In modern states, government enforcement is relatively more 
effective than the church.  The church has an advantage in the 
intermediate case where local control and state enforcement are 
relatively weak. 
Church provision of these valuable public goods is 
consistent with the assumption of profit-maximization.  When it 
has a comparative advantage at producing these public goods, the 
church enhances its own wealth by doing so.  Further, these 
activities promote the wealth and assure the survival of the society.  
In so doing, the church indirectly promotes its own survival and 
prosperity.  This is simply another version of Stigler's (1958) 
survivorship principle and Alchian's (1950) notion of natural 
selection and profit maximization. 
The idea that church doctrine is encouraged by natural 
selection to increase social welfare is necessarily simplistic and 




overlooks several important issues.  In his important analysis of 
social structure and economic development, North (1981) shows 
how welfare maximization is one of two important forces 
motivating governments.  Those who control a government prosper 
when they increase a society's wealth, but also prosper by using 
taxes for personal gain or to appease other powerful groups.  This 
taxation makes the rulers better off, but weakens the economy.  
Although he never makes the extension, North's analysis of 
government behavior applies as well to the church.  The church 
obviously gains by encouraging economic prosperity but just as 
obviously gains by exploiting the economy. 
Also not addressed here is the potential desire by a church 
to maximize its own size and influence, rather than simple profit.  
For governments this theme is pursued by Niskanen (1971).  Size 
and influence maximization seems consistent with the desire by 
religions to increase membership but does not explain why 
churches would include any demanding behavior as a condition of 
membership.  This alternative assumption also implies behavior 
not dissimilar to that of profit maximization.  In this same vein, the 
bureaucracy implied by a large church organization necessarily 
faces enormous agency problems.  These agency problems are an 
important issue, surely playing a role in the eventual decline in 
Catholic Church power in the fourteenth century. 
 
 
Why Was Hell Rezoned? 
 
After the [Roman] Empire's collapse, the medieval 
society that emerged was a set of disjointed and 
clashing parts subject to no central or effective 
secular authority.  Only the Church offered an 
organizing principle, which was the reason for its 
success, for society cannot bear anarchy. 
(Tuchman, 1978, p. 5) 
 




As discussed, the Catholic Church in the High Middle Ages 
introduced and promoted heaven, hell, and judgment at death.  
What purpose did such a change in doctrine serve?  Simply, these 
were effective tools in enforcing particular social behavior and 
property rights in locations where state authority and local 
community enforcement were relatively ineffective. 
The feudal system, where local control of social behavior 
was possible, became relatively weaker as independent towns and 
cities emerged.  The fragmented and weak central governments 
were unable to exercise control of either feudal lords or the 
independent cities and towns.  The church possessed a comparative 
advantage in enforcing particular behavior and provided this as a 
joint product of its revenue earning activities. 
Miskimin (1969, p. 3) reviews the writings of the thirteenth 
century Christian theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas, 
noting the importance of church property rights enforcement: 
 
.  .  .  Aquinas offered a defense of private property. 
Private ownership was the best form of property 
division, since it prevented possible disruption of the 
social order, by providing clearly delineated rules of 
possession and since it contributed motivation for care 
in the use of property for energetic devotion to labor. 
 
When these political ideas, theoretical though they may 
be, were sustained by an institution with such power 
and prestige as the thirteenth-century Catholic Church 
possessed, they constituted a significant force in the 
organization, structure, and contemporary conceptions 
of economic activity and fiscal policy. 
 
 
Did Lords Misbehave? 
 
Church influence on medieval society acted through any 
number of agents.  Two are examined in this essay: the feudal 




lords and the mendicant orders.  For the first, the question is the 
degree to which lords chose to exploit their power. 
That the feudal lord possessed nearly absolute political and 
economic power is not disputed.  In addition, since the feudal 
system enforced the exclusive and absolute power of local lords, 
competition from other potential lords for a given lord's monopoly 
power was limited. 
Three forces acted to prevent lords from fully exploiting 
their monopoly position, however.  First, following one of this 
paper's important themes, the long run prosperity and survival of 
the lord depended in large part on his ability to assure the support 
of his serfs.  An excessively exploitive lord would lose wealth and 
power relative to nearby lords and so would face possible loss of 
territory.  The lord was compelled to provide efficient incentives to 
serfs.  Second, the High Middle Ages were a period of relative 
labor scarcity.  Serfs could and did move among manors or move 
to undeveloped land (North 1981; Bloch, 1961). 
A third force encouraging proper behavior by the lord was 
the Catholic Church, directly through its own doctrine and 
persuasion and indirectly through knightly codes of behavior.  
Although little direct evidence exists to show that lords treated 
serfs better because of church doctrine and pressure, other lordly 
behavior provides an indirect clue.  In particular, lords provided 
significant financial support to local churches (Aries, 1981).  Lords 
donated the money to assure themselves a good afterlife.  Church 
doctrine encouraged these financial contributions, but church 
doctrine also required of individuals good social behavior to 
achieve a desirable afterlife.  Because we observe the money 
contributions, we can reasonably infer their good behavior.  The 
work of authors like Ladurie (1978) who documents the daily lives 
of villagers in France and Homans (1960) who does the same for 
Great Britain also confirms that the relationship between lord and 
serfs was generally positive. 
As further evidence, knights, and lords were usually 
knights, gradually came to adopt a code of Christian behavior.  
Although often only implied, at least one formal set of guidelines 




was compiled.  Sonizo of Sutri wrote the Liber de Vita Christiana 
(c. 1090).  The code promoted loyalty, bravery, and justice.  It 
enjoined knights to protect the poor, widows, and orphans, and to 
eschew plunder.  The guidelines clearly encouraged the sort of 
social behavior theorized here. 
More dramatic examples of knightly commitment to 
Christian behavior are the knightly orders organized in the High 
Middle Ages.  The Knights Hospitalers or Knights of St. John 
formed from a group who cared for pilgrims to Jerusalem.  Pope 
Paschall II recognized the order in 1113 A.D.  The Knights 
Templars formed during the Crusades and were recognized in 1128 
A.D. by Pope Honorius III.  The Teutonic Knights formed during 
the siege of Acre in 1190 A.D. 
Members of the knightly orders took vows of poverty, 
chastity, and obedience.  They adopted high standards of moral 
behavior, enforced in part through papal authority.  Interestingly, 
the moral standards and military ability of the Knights Templar 
encouraged the French crown to use them to manage the 
government's treasury and to transport gold. 
The orders eventually fell victim to their own military 
power and to their ability to attract members and wealth.  The 
resulting corruption doomed the orders.  Importantly, their early 
success—which created the temptation for corruption—derived 
directly from the high ideals established and enforced by the 
orders.  This is consistent with the economic theory of religion.  
Their failure emphasizes the difficulty of enforcing particular 
behavior even with tools available to churches. 
 
 
The Independent Cities and the Mendicant Orders 
 
That the feudal system endured for so long is evidence of 
its ability to provide for its members.  However, the feudal system 
was poorly adapted to encourage economic growth and 
development.  The system discouraged the interregional trade that 
allows specialization and industrialization, in turn promoting the 




exploitation of economies of scale.  These functions were 
gradually provided by cities and towns independent of feudal 
authority. 
Feudal lords usually granted the status of independent 
"communes" to cities and towns in exchange for tax payments 
from the citizens and from craft guilds.  Lords made the grants 
because of financial, political, or social pressure (Tuchman, 1978, 
p. 5; Braudel, 1979, p. 510).  Grants were made throughout the 
Middle Ages, but the pace increased significantly in the beginning 
of the twelfth century.  These towns became true productive units 
and not just administrative centers (Miskimin, 1969).  The most 
successful independent cities were international trading centers 
like Venice, Genoa, and Lubeck. 
Because feudal authority did not extend into the 
independent communities and because central governments were 
too immature to exercise control, other means evolved to produce 
valuable social goods.  Craft guilds provided some social services 
to members (Tuchman, 1978).  More interesting are the activities 
and doctrine of the mendicant religious orders. 
From the earliest years of the Church, dedicated Christians 
expressed their commitment by forming monastic orders.  
Commonly these holy orders withdrew into relative isolation to 
pursue lives of contemplation and prayer.  The Cistercian Order, 
for example, cleared farmland from the wilderness to support their 
activities (Lyon, 1964). 
A distinctly different form of holy order emerged in the 
first years of the thirteenth century, the nature and doctrine of 
which is consistent with the economic theory of religion.  Pope 
Honorius III recognized the prototype of these Mendicant Orders 
in 1209 A.D. shortly after its formation by St. Francis.  Honorius 
formally confirmed the Rule of the Franciscan Order in 1223 A.D.  
Only six years after first recognizing the Franciscan Order, 
Honorius approved another of the mendicant orders, the 
Dominicans.  The third important mendicant order originally was 
formed in the middle of the twelfth century by hermits on Mount 
Carmel in Palestine.  Importantly, St. Simon transformed 




Carmelite doctrine in 1264 A.D., making it similar to that of the 
other mendicant orders (Esser, 1970; Iriarte 1982). 
Why are the mendicant orders of interest here?  Because 
they spread Catholic doctrine to independent cities and towns and 
because the orders adopted predictable techniques to make their 
doctrine convincing.  An explicit part of mendicant doctrine was 
itinerant preaching to cities and towns (Esser, 1970).  The 
emerging cities and towns had limited central authority to enforce 
behavior (Iriarte, 1982). 
The mendicant orders shared a number of important 
characteristics, particularly their fundamental doctrine.  The ideal 
was Imitatio Christi—to live the life of Christ.  Loyalty to the 
orders and then to the Pope was paramount.  The orders required of 
their members poverty, chastity, and obedience. 
The strict and sacrificial nature of mendicant behavior 
standards served the important function of assuring product quality 
to potential converts.  Monks without wealth or family have no 
incentive to misrepresent doctrine and embezzle donations.  In its 
early years, the Franciscan Order in particular discouraged 
members from owning or using permanent dwellings, preventing 
that form of wealth accumulation as well.  The humble and unique 
clothing adopted by the orders serves the same function.  Not 
surprisingly, the Catholic Church forbade others from wearing the 
clothing of the orders (Esser, 1970).  Other practices consistent 
with quality assurance include the apprenticeship periods required 
of new members and the requirement that members remain in the 
orders for life.3 
What did the mendicants preach?  The mendicants wanted 
to persuade urban dwellers to convert to a version of the Catholic 
doctrine, a version that required particular and valuable social 
behavior.  The mendicants wanted converts to behave properly, but 
the orders could not rely on secular authority to enforce good 
behavior.  The state was not powerful and a priest could not draw 
on the power of the lord to enforce good behavior in the 
independent communities.  To solve this enforcement problem, the 




mendicants invented or at least exploited the inventions of hell and 
judgment at death. 
Hell and judgment at death increase the cost of 
misbehavior.  Hell increases both the expected cost and variance in 
payoffs after death of improper behavior.  To the extent that 
individuals are risk averse, an increase in variance also effectively 
increases expected cost.  Judgment at death is more costly in 
present value terms than judgment at the end of time to the extent 
that individuals possess a positive discount rate.4 
What about the role of purgatory, also promoted by the 
mendicants?  Since purgatory allowed the dead a second chance, it 
encouraged donations of money after death to the church for 
prayer and good works.  Perhaps more importantly, purgatory 
prevented individuals from intentionally or accidentally defaulting 
on money debts at death.  Relatives, heirs, or provisions in wills 
were used to redeem a debtor who would otherwise be condemned 
to eternal damnation. 
Protecting property rights in financial instruments was an 
important function in which the medieval church had a 
comparative advantage.  Towns and cities were beginning to use 
money-based trade, including debt instruments.  Absent, however, 
were some of the methods available in modern economies to 
protect lenders.  The corporation had not yet formed so asset 
ownership was limited to one lifetime and one individual.  The 
absence of life insurance on borrowers increased the risk born by a 
lender.  Finally, secular courts and other feudal authority were 
absent or weak in the independent communities.  The church as an 
enforcer of financial property rights was the obvious alternative. 
From what evidence has survived, the promise of heaven 
and threat of hell did influence individual behavior in the predicted 
way:  "...  concern for their own salvation, especially acute as death 
drew near, disposed people to pay heed to the voice of the church, 
..." (Bloch, 1961, p. 258.). 
In addition to providing for repayment of debt, individual 
wills show that substantial resources were redistributed to the poor 
and other deserving groups, exactly the sort of redistribution that 




otherwise was provided by feudal lords or is provided by modern 
central governments.  Wills commonly set aside money and 
detailed the desired burial ceremony.  Much of the money for the 
ceremony went to hire the poor as mourners and attendants. 
 
[Priests and Monks] were followed by a group, whose 
size varied according to the wealth and generosity of 
the deceased, made up of poor people and children from 
foundling homes.  They carried candles and torches, 
and, in addition to the robes, they were given alms in 
exchange for their attendance. 
(Aries, 1981, p. 165). 
 
Wills also allocated money for activities after the burial.  
Some portion paid for prayers for the dead, an activity that hardly 
improves temporal social welfare.  However, even these donations 
went to the church which in turn used it to support charitable 
activities.  By far the largest proportion of bequests, however, went 
to fund charitable endowments, a conclusion in unpublished 
research by Elaine Clark and consistent with material Aries 
presents. 
 
Besides these endowments for Masses .  .  .  there were 
also charitable endowments: a contribution to a 
hospital for a bed, or the living expenses or dowry of 
a poor girl.  Donations to abbeys, monasteries, and 
schools were common and generous in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.  (Aries, 1981, p. 181) 
 
Another characteristic of medieval wills was that they 
encouraged accumulation of temporal wealth.  The traditional 
Christian ideal was of lifetime poverty and humbleness.  If it 
allowed a wealthy individual to purchase heaven at death, the will 
encouraged wealth accumulation.  With a will, both temporal and 
heavenly riches were possible.  "The will .  .  .  legitimized and 
authorized the enjoyment—otherwise suspect—of property 




acquired during a lifetime" (Aries, 1981, p. 191).  This opportunity 
provided incentive for economic growth and development.  It 
created incentive to maximize wealth and assured that the wealth 






This application of the economic theory of religion and the 
church is obviously very limited in scope, explaining only one 
change in church doctrine during a period of significant change in 
all aspects of culture and society.  This application also offers no 
explanation for the eventual decline (and near collapse) of the 
church in the fourteenth century.  Certainly the plagues, which 
struck urban areas in particular, played a role.  The prolonged 
warfare and the emergence of national identities likely also eroded 
the power of a "universal" international church. 
The church itself also contributed to its own decline.  As 
discussed earlier, the church enhances its own wealth first by 
promoting overall economic growth and second by exploiting an 
economy.  Perhaps the latter of the two church motives became 
more important than the former. 
Despite its limitations, this work breaks important ground 
in applying economic theory to a new area of society.  This 
research shows that economic theory can explain changes in 
religious behavior and such an extension has potential application 
to other periods of human history. 




1. This simple treatment of the feudal system ignores the 
considerable local variation in its structure.  Even the use of the 
term "feudal" to encompass the variety of institutions is 
disputed.  For two important treatments of the feudal system and 
the High Middle Ages see Bloch (1961) and Lyon (1964). 
2. That Christianity and Islam emerged at the same time is not 
coincidental, nor is the similarity of their doctrine.  Both filled a 
vacuum left by the Roman Empire's collapse.  Both extended 
beyond regional and national boundaries.  Both promoted 
religious conquest and active conversion of non-believers.  Both 
supported the particular social behavior and property rights 
protection discussed later, for reasons also discussed later. 
3. Bold and Hull (1985) discuss in more detail activities which 
assure honesty on the part of priests and the church.  As an 
aside, both the Carmelites and Franciscans became important 
educators in the early and largely religiously supported 
universities.  Education is another public good provided first by 
churches and then by the state as its role became more 
important. 
4. Consistent with the idea of promoting heaven, hell, and 
judgment at death, the Catholic Church also discouraged, to a 
greater or lesser degree, charging positive interest on loans 
(usury).  For a complete treatment, see Benjamin Nelson (1969).  
If the church is able to use this rule to reduce individual 
discount rates, the present value of heaven and present cost of 
hell increase.  Interestingly, the strongest church statement 
against usury was issued by the Second Lateran Council in A.D. 
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